Constitutional Law Leading Cases: Judicial Elections by Oman, Nathan B.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2002
Constitutional Law Leading Cases: Judicial
Elections
Nathan B. Oman
William & Mary Law School, nboman@wm.edu
Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Oman, Nathan B., "Constitutional Law Leading Cases: Judicial Elections" (2002). Faculty Publications. Paper 536.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/536
272 HARVARD LAW REVIEW (Vol. 116:200 
2. Judicial Elections. - In an attempt to insulate judicial elections 
from partisan politics, many states have canons that forbid candidates 
for judicial office from expressing views on controversial topics during 
their campaigns. 1 There have been several challenges to these rules on 
free speech grounds. 2 Last Term, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, 3 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment forbids 
states from restricting judicial candidates' statements on contentious 
issues in the name of preserving judicial integrity. 4 The outcome in 
Republican Party suggests that there is a majority for an antifunction-
alist approach to free speech analysis on the Court, which could bode 
well for challengers to recently enacted campaign finance regulations. 
92 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973); David A.J. Richards, Free 
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
4S, 4S-46 (1974) (arguing that the Constitution generally, and the First Amendment in particular, 
incorporate substantive moral concepts); cj. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., SOI U.S. s6o, S7S (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Our society prohibits ... certain activities not because 
they harm others but because they are considered ... 'contra bonos mores,' i.e., immoral."). 
93 Barnes, SOI U.S. at S69 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 61; and Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)). 
94 This exception could become even larger, because actual child pornographers might claim 
that their images are virtual child pornography to raise a reasonable doubt in their cases. 
95 See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., S29 U.S. 277, 289 (2ooo) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that nude dancing qualifies for First Amendment protection); Barnes, so1 U.S. at s6s-66 (same). 
1 See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS IOS9, 1o6s-67 (1996) (discussing the "efforts over several generations to 
restrain speech ... by judges'). 
2 Compare Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 13 7 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding an ethical 
canon against a free speech challenge), with Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) (striking down an ethical canon on free speech grounds). 
3 122 S. Ct. 2s28 (2002). 
4 ld. at 2s42. 
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Minnesota has had rules governing the behavior of judicial candi-
dates for over fifty years.5 Since 1995, Canon 5 of the Judicial Code 
has contained the injunction that "[a] candidate for a judicial office, 
including an incumbent judge[,] shall not ... make pledges or prom-
ises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial perform-
ance of the duties of the office; [or] announce his or her views on dis-
puted legal or political issues."6 The first prohibition is known as the 
"promise clause," while the second prohibition is known as the "an-
nounce clause."' In addition, Canon 5 prohibits judicial candidates 
from speaking at or attending political party meetings, soliciting politi-
cal party endorsements, identifying their own party, and personally so-
liciting campaign contributions.8 In 1998, a judicial candidate named 
Gregory Wersal and the Minnesota Republican Party sued the Minne-
sota Board on Judicial Standards alleging that Canon 5 's prohibitions 
violated Wersal 's right to freedom of association and freedom of 
speech under the U.S. Constitution.9 
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. 10 The bulk of 
the opinion addressed the challenges to the party-related restrictions 
and the ban on soliciting campaign contributions. 11 With regard to the 
announce clause, the court found that a narrow construction allowed it 
to survive a facial overbreadth claim. 12 Citing Minnesota precedent 
requiring that statutes be read - where possible - to avoid unconsti-
tutionality, the court limited the announce clause by interpreting it as 
only restricting a judicial candidate's ability to comment on those 
cases likely to come before his or her court. 13 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Writing for the panel, Judge Gib-
son 14 acknowledged that Canon 5 should be subject to strict scrutiny 
under the First Amendment, 15 but not before noting that the judicial 
role places unique constraints on judges and judicial candidates. 16 He 
5 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 970 (D. Minn. 1999). 
6 MINN. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5 (2000). 
7 See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875, 877 (D. Minn. 1998) 
8 MINN. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5 (2000). 
9 Republican Party, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 974· Wersal also argued that the prohibitions related to 
political parties violated the Equal Protection Clause. /d. 
10 /d. at 986. The plaintiffs had first made an unsuccessful attempt to get a temporary re-
straining order. /d. at 974· The district court's refusal to grant the order was upheld on appeal. 
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 98-831 MJD, 1998 WL 764782 (8th Cir. Oct. 19, 1998). 
11 The court decided that these restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve the state's compel-
ling interests in an impartial and independent judiciary and in preserving the appearance of im-
partiality. Republican Party, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 974-76. 
12 !d. at 985. 
13 /d. (discussing In re Welfare of R.A. V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991)). 
14 Judge McMillian joined Judge Gibson's opinion. 
15 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 864 (8th Cir. 2001). 
16 /d. at 862 ("[T]he differences between judges and other government officials bear on the 
strength of the state's interest in restricting political speech." (quoting In re Chmura, 6o8 N.W.2d 
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next turned his attention to the government's concern for judicial in-
tegrity, concluding that Minnesota's interest in preserving an inde-
pendent judiciary was "undeniably compelling."17 In discussing the 
announce clause, Judge Gibson first noted that it would advance the 
government's interest by keeping judges out of the awkward position 
of either affirming past statements (in which case they looked craven) 
or reversing them (in which case they looked vacillating). 18 Such a di-
lemma creates a risk of actual or apparent partiality. 19 He went on to 
adopt the district court's narrowing construction to save the announce 
clause from the charge of unconstitutionality. 20 
Judge Beam dissented. He began his analysis by noting that all at-
tempts to establish an appointed judiciary in Minnesota had failed. 21 
In the face of this history, Judge Beam questioned whether Minnesota 
had an interest in keeping its judiciary independent of electoral pres-
sure. 22 "[W]hen a state opts to hold an election, it must commit itself 
to a complete election, replete with free speech and association. "23 
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Scalia24 found that the canon, as interpreted, "prohibits speech on the 
basis of its content," and proceeded to subject it to strict scrutiny. 25 
After skeptically reviewing narrowing constructions of the canon, the 
Court parsed the state's asserted interest in judicial impartiality and 
the appearance of impartiality, offering three possible interpretations of 
the term.26 First, it discussed '"impartiality' in the judicial context" as 
referring to "the lack of bias for or against either party to a proceed-
ing."27 The Court faulted the announce clause for a lack of narrow 
tailoring under this justification. 28 Announcing an opinion on a 
particular issue, the Court reasoned, is not the same as announcing a 
3 I, 39-40 (Mich. 2000) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. ("The judi-
cial candidate simply does not have a First Amendment right to promise to abuse his office.")). 17 /d. at 864. Judge Gibson went on to find that all of the challenged restrictions were nar-
rowly tailored to advance this interest. /d. at 868-85. 18 /d. at 878. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. at 881. 21 I d. at 885-91 (Beam, J., dissenting). 
22 See id. at 891. 23 /d. at897. 
24 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice 
Scalia's opinion. 25 Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2534. 26 /d. at 2535-36 ("Respondents are rather vague ... about what they mean by 'impartial-
ity.' . . . Clarity on this point is essential before we can decide whether impartiality is indeed a 
compelling state interest, and, if so, whether the announce clause is narrowly tailored to achieve 
it."). 27 /d. at 2535. 28 /d. at 2535-36. 
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bias against a particular individual. 29 Second, the Court considered 
defining "impartiality" as "lack of preconception in favor of or against 
a particular legal view."30 But the Court observed that a "tabula rasa" 
on a legal issue "would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of 
bias."31 Finally, the Court considered impartiality as an openminded-
ness that "seeks to guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to win 
the legal points in the case, but at least some chance of doing so."32 
The Court concluded, however, that "[a]s a means of pursuing [open-
mindedness], the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to 
render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous. "33 The an-
nounce clause forbade only a tiny fraction of statements on disputed 
issues, since it did not prohibit such statements either before a candi-
date declared his candidacy or once he took his seat on the bench. 34 
The Court ended its analysis by discussing and rejecting the claim that 
long historical practice justified the canon, noting that when compared 
to the long history of judicial elections, such canons were of recent vin-
tage.35 
Justice O'Connor concurred to "express [her] concerns about judi-
cial elections generally."36 Nevertheless, she remained sharply critical 
of the announce clauseY Justice Kennedy also concurred. He de-
fended and praised the integrity of state court judges.38 But unlike the 
majority, he would have held Minnesota's content-based restriction to 
be per se unconstitutional. 39 
Justice Stevens dissented,40 arguing that "the Court defies any sen-
sible notion of the judicial office and the importance of impartiality in 
that context."41 Drawing a sharp distinction between "issues of policy" 
and "issues of law or fact," he offered several criticisms of the Court's 
29 !d. ("Any party taking that position is just as likely to lose. The judge is applying the law 
(as he sees it) evenhandedly."). 30 !d. at 2536. 31 See id. at 2536 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 32 !d. at 2536. 33 ld. at 2537. 34 !d. The opinion does contemplate that such statements would be forbidden once "litigation 
is pending." See id. 35 !d. at 254o-4r. 36 !d. at 2542 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
37 !d. at 2544 ("In [having judicial elections] the State has voluntarily taken on the risks of ju-
dicial bias."). 38 !d. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 39 See id. at 2544. 40 Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens's dissent. 41 Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2546 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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analysis. 42 He had particularly harsh words for judicial candidates 
who make "statements [that] seek to enhance [their popularity] by in-
dicating how [they] would rule in specific cases if elected."43 Such 
statements, he wrote, "evidence a lack of fitness for the office."44 Jus-
tice Stevens argued that when a candidate offers statements "as a rea-
son to vote for him," the state "has a compelling interest in sanctioning 
such statements."45 
Justice Ginsburg also dissented.46 In critiquing the Court's doc-
trinal analysis, Justice Ginsburg began by emphasizing that "judges 
perform a function fundamentally different from that of the people's 
elected representatives."47 She suggested that the majority struck 
down the speech restrictions because an "electoral process [was] at 
stake. "48 The Court, she argued, held that "if Minnesota opts to elect 
its judges ... the State may not rein in what candidates may say."49 
Rejecting this "unilocular, 'an election is an election,' approach," she 
distinguished judges as occupying a unique, nonpolitical position.50 
The courts below had narrowed the announce clause to allow robust 
discussion, provided that candidates did not discuss how they would 
decide particular future cases.51 Properly understood, she insisted, the 
announce clause was not an "election-nullifying" speech restriction.52 
An examination of this case in the context of the Court's broader 
First Amendment jurisprudence indicates that the Republican Party 
Court took an antifunctionalist approach to free speech. The applica-
tion of such an approach to some of the recently enacted campaign fi-
nance restrictions does not bode well for their constitutionality. 
42 Justice Stevens explicitly rejected the Court's assertion that conceptual predispositions do 
not bias courts against particular parties and its claim that judicial openmindedness was unim-
portant or unattainable. See id. at 2548-49. 
43 /d. at 254i· 
44 /d. 
45 /d. at 2548. 
46 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent. 
47 Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2550 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting). 
48 /d. 
49 /d. 
50 !d. at 255 r. 
51 See id. at 2553 (observing that the announce clause prevents a judicial candidate from 
"publicly making known how [she] would decide" (alteration in original) (quoting Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 24i F. 3d 854, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Likewise, she faulted the majority for modifying authoritative judicial construction with 
"respondents' on the spot answers to fast-paced hypothetical questions at oral argument." /d. 
52 See id. at 2554 (quoting Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2539). Justice Ginsburg also ana-
lyzed the announce clause as a necessary adjunct to the promise clause, which the petitioners did 
not challenge in this case. /d. at 2556-58. 
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Commentators have identified antifunctionalism with the view that 
speech is an inherent good associated with autonomy.53 For example, 
in Cohen v. Calijornia,54 the Court extended First Amendment protec-
tion to the wearer of a jacket emblazoned with anti-conscription ob-
scenities because, in part, such expression represented "otherwise inex-
pressible emotions."55 Similarly, Justice Kennedy has defended speech 
on the theory that it is inextricably linked to freedom itself: "The right 
to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected 
from the government because speech is the beginning of thought."56 
Professor G. Edward White has gone so far as to identify as one of the 
central themes of twentieth-century First Amendment theory the 
emergence of absolutist, self-expressive justifications for free speech 
from philosophically or democratically instrumental theories. 57 
However, many of the most powerful modern theories of free 
speech have rested on functionalist arguments that justify protections 
for types of speech by referring to the useful role each plays in society. 
Justice Holmes offered the earliest modern defense of free speech in his 
dissent in Abrams v. United States: 58 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe ... that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that 
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out. 5 9 
Holmes justified free speech by referring to its instrumental ability to 
facilitate a social process of discovering truth, pragmatically defined in 
terms of usefulness. Functionalist understandings of free speech con-
tinue to be important. In particular, freedom of speech has come to be 
related to the ideals of the democratic process.60 Justice Brandeis jus-
53 
"[I]s the freedom of speech to be regarded only as a means to some further end ... or is 
freedom of speech in part also an end in itself, an expression of the sort of society we wish to be-
come and the sort of persons we wish to be?" LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW§ I2-I, at 785 (2d ed. r988) (footnote omitted). 
54 403 U.S. I5 (I97I~ 
55 /d. at 26. 
56 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, r22 S. Ct. r389, r403 (2oo2). 
57 See G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech 
in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 39o-92 (r996) (summarizing the structure 
of developments in twentieth-century free speech theory). 
58 250 U.S. 6r6 (r9r9). 
59 /d. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes's justification for free speech grew from the soil 
of philosophical pragmatism - perhaps the most aggressively functionalist epistemology in his-
tory - and not surprisingly is aggressively functionalist itself. See LOUIS MENAND, THE 
METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 430-3I (2oor). 
6° For an account of the development of twentieth-century free speech theory and its shift 
from justifications rooted in pragmatic epistemology to those centered around the political theory 
of democracy, see generally White, supra note 57. 
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tified speech as a method of discovering "political truth,"61 and Alex-
ander Meiklejohn, an influential mid-century theorist, argued that free 
speech is . a necessary condition for self-government, invoking the 
model of New England town meeetings. 62 More recent theorists have 
argued that speech should be protected to keep open the channels of 
political change63 or to foster informed, civic-minded deliberation.64 
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Republican Party takes an anti-
functionalist approach to free speech. He rejects the functionalist idea 
that protection of speech is a function of that speech's instrumental 
value.65 The majority opinion stands in contrast to Justice Ginsburg's 
dissent, which articulates a functionalist justification for protecting 
speech - ensuring that voters can hold officials accountable for their 
political actions66 - and then argues that this justification does not 
extend to the context of judicial elections.67 
61 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (I927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
62 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVER."l"MENT 22-27 (I948). "As the self-governing community seeks, by the method of voting, 
to gain wisdom in action, it can find it only in the minds of its individual citizens. If they fail, it 
fails. That is why freedom of discussion for those minds may not be abridged." /d. at 25. 
63 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST I05-I6 (1980) (criticizing and de-
fending free speech doctrine on this basis). 
64 See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN 
STATE 255, 304 (Geoffrey R. Stone, Richard A. Epstein & Cass R. Sunstein eds., I992) (arguing 
for heightened First Amendment protection for political speech, defined as speech "both intended 
and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue"). 
65 Ironically, Justice Ginsburg accused the majority of taking an aggressively functionalist ap-
proach. Republican Party, I22 S. Ct. at 2550 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting) ("The speech restriction 
must fail, in the Court's view, because an electoral process is at stake."). Yet as Justice Scalia 
rightly pointed out, Justice Ginsburg was responding to an "argument[] we do not make." Repub-
lican Party, I22 S. Ct. at 2539. Although he cited cases involving election speech, Justice Scalia 
disclaimed the idea that it is the context of an election that endows the speech with protection: 
[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial 
office to sound the same as those for legislative office .... We rely on the cases involving 
speech during elections only to make the obvious point that [the announce clause's] un-
derinclusiveness cannot be explained by resort to the notion that the First Amendment 
provides less protection during an election campaign than at other times. 
/d. at 2539 (footnote and citation omitted). 
66 Contrast Justice Scalia's perfunctory statement that election speech is "at the core of 
... [the] First Amendment," Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2534 (quoting Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 864 (8th Cir. 2001)), with Justice Ginsburg's detailed functional-
ist analysis: 
Candidates for political offices, in keeping with their representative role, must be left 
free to inform the electorate of their positions on specific issues. Armed with such in-
formation, the individual voter will be equipped to cast her ballot intelligently, to vote 
for the candidate committed to positions the voter approves. Campaign statements 
committing the candidate to take sides on contentious issues are therefore not only ap-
propriate in political elections, they are "at the core of our electoral process" .... 
/d. at 255 I (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
6 7 Republican Party, I 2 2 S. Ct. at 2 55 r (Ginsburg, ]., dissenting) ("[T]he rationale underlying 
unconstrained speech in elections for political office ... does not carry over to campaigns for the 
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Yet despite its apparent rejection of functionalism, the majority 
does not seem to adopt the traditional autonomy-based, antifunctional-
ist approach to free speech. One will search the opinion in vain for 
references to "the premise of individual dignity and choice"68 or other 
nods toward philosophies of personal autonomy. Since the opinion is 
silent regarding the justification for free speech that it adopts, one 
must be cautious in making claims, but it seems that at base the justi-
fication is some form of textualism.69 Certainly, aggressive judicial re-
view on the basis of seemingly absolutist textual language - "make no 
law ... abridging the freedom of speech"70 - has analogues elsewhere 
in Justice Scalia's jurisprudence.71 For example, in Maryland v. 
Craig,72 the Court considered the question whether the Confrontation 
Clause73 gave an accused child molester the absolute right to be physi-
cally present during the testimony of his alleged victim. 74 The Court 
held that because the state had a compelling interest "in protecting 
children who are allegedly victims of child abuse from the trauma of 
testifying against the alleged perpetrator,"75 it was permissible for 
states to dispense with face-to-face confrontation. 76 Justice Scalia dis-
sented, arguing that "[s]eldom has this Court failed so conspicuously to 
sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of 
prevailing current opinion."77 His opinion stressed the "unmistakable 
bench."). The majority opinion did state that "speech about the qualifications of candidates" lies 
"at the core of our First Amendment freedoms," Republican Party, 122 S Ct. at 2534 (quoting Re-
publican Party, 247 F.3d at 863) (internal quotation marks omitted), and noted that "[w]e have 
never allowed the government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to 
voters during an election," id. at 2538. However, taken in context these statements seem like rhe-
torical flourishes because they are not accompanied by sustained functionalist reasoning. 
68 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
69 Justice Scalia, of course, is a self-described "textualist in good standing." Antonin Scalia, 
Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Inter-
preting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997). 
7D U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
71 Justice Scalia has forcefully defended free speech on the basis of distrust of the government 
rather than some instrumentalist account. In his view, "the absolutely central truth of the First 
Amendment [is] that government cannot be trusted to assure, through censorship, the 'fairness' of 
political debate." Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 68o (1990) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). Notably, however, his fear of censorship is not tied to any detailed articulation of a 
specific good to be achieved through freedom of speech. Unlike the functionalist analysis of Jus-
tice Ginsburg, Justice Scalia's approach does not grant differing levels of protection based on the 
function that the speech serves. 
72 497 u.s. 836 (1990). 
7 3 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
74 Craig, 497 U.S. at 840. 
75 ld. at 852. 
76 ld. at857. 
77 /d. at 86o (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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clarity" of the Sixth Amendment, 78 and he later affirmed that textual-
ism motivated his decision. 79 Similar textualism seems to be at work 
in Republican Party. The opinion, contrary to Justice Ginsburg's 
characterization, does not rest on an "an election is an election" ra-
tionale. Although the underlying rationale is not clearly stated, it 
seems to be a "speech is speech" rationale that refuses to differentiate 
levels of constitutional protection on the basis of function. 
Proponents of campaign finance laws have used functionalist ar-
guments to uphold restrictions - including some that discriminated on 
the basis of content - against First Amendment challenges. Justice 
Marshall, for example, invoked an ideal of "equal access to the politi-
cal arena" to argue unsuccessfully that Congress should have the right 
to limit independent advocacy in presidential elections.80 A few years 
later, a version of Justice Marshall's functionalism commanded a ma-
jority in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,81 in which the 
Court upheld a state law forbidding the use of corporate treasury 
funds to support or oppose any candidate for state office.82 Writing 
for the Court in Austin, Justice Marshall reasoned that the state could 
regulate such expenditures to ensure that speech in the political mar-
ketplace reflected popular support rather than economic resources.83 
Behind both of these opinions stands a functionalist vision of speech as 
a tool serving a model of democratic discourse free of "the corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth."84 More re-
cently, Justice Breyer has argued that limitations on campaign contri-
butions, which are subject to First Amendment scrutiny,85 actually 
78 !d. 
79 Scalia, supra note 69, at 43-44. Justice Scalia wrote: "I dissented, because the Sixth 
Amendment provides that 'in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.' There is no doubt what confrontation meant - or 
indeed means today. It means face-to-face, not watching from another room." !d. 
8° Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'! Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 521 
(1985) (Marshall, ]., dissenting) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 287 (1976) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
82 !d. at 654-55. 
83 See id. at 659 ("[T]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation ... are not an indi-
cation of popular support for the corporation's political ideas." (quoting Federal Election Com-
mission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986)) (second alteration in 
original)); id. ("We ... have recognized that 'the compelling governmental interest in preventing 
corruption support[s] the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the 
corporate form."' (quoting Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action 
Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 50o-o1 (1985)) (alteration in original)). 
84 I d. at 66o. 
85 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 2o-2 r (per curiam) (arguing that although "a limitation upon the 
amount that any one person ... may contribute to a candidate ... entails only a marginal restric-
tion on the contributor's ability to engage in free communication," it is possible that "contribution 
restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candi-
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serve to advance free speech.86 According to Justice Breyer, contribu-
tion limits "seek to protect the integrity of the electoral process - the 
means through which a free society democratically translates political 
speech into concrete government action."87 Not surprisingly, Justice 
Scalia has been hostile to these functional justifications for limitations 
on the "First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech."88 
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA),89 like the law at is-
sue in Republican Party, contains content-based restrictions on speech. 
The act effectively prohibits so-called 5or(c) or 527 organizations -
groups such as the National Rifle Association and the Sierra Club -
from broadcasting any advertisement within sixty days of a federal 
election that mentions the name of a federal candidate. 90 This provi-
sion of BCRA already faces a court challenge. 91 Predicting the out-
come of a challenge to a complex law such as BCRA is difficult; but 
the law is likely to fare better in the hands of a functionalist majority 
than an antifunctionalist one. Proponents of BCRA claim that its re-
strictions are necessary to ensure that 50r(c) and 527 organizations do 
not become alternative conduits for the so-called "soft money" contri-
dates ... from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy"); id. at 22 ("[C]ontribution 
... limitations also impinge on protected associational freedoms."). 
86 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (zooo) (Breyer, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that campaign finance restrictions "encourag[e] the public participation and open discus-
sion that the First Amendment itself presupposes"). 
87 !d. 
88 Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2534. Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinions in 
Austin and Nixon. 
89 Pub L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). 
90 BCRA accomplishes this through - to put it mildly - a rather convoluted set of provi-
sions. First, it defines "electioneering activity" to include advertisements mentioning a candidate's 
name within sixty days of an election or thirty days of a primary election. See id. § 201(a), 116 
Stat. at 89. BCRA then forbids "electioneering activity" by corporations, unions, or any organiza-
tion to which they donate. !d. § 202, II6 Stat. at 91. Then BCRA specifically creates an excep-
tion that allows 501(c) and 527 organizations to engage in "electioneering activity" without their 
activity being counted as electioneering activity for the purposes of the act, provided that they do 
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fully admitted for permanent residence." !d. § 203(b), II6 Stat. at 91. Then it creates an excep-
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Civ. No. 02-582 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 12, 2002), available at http://www.law.stanford.edunibrary/ 
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1 16:2oo 
butions that the law banned.92 Soft money refers to large contribu-
tions from corporate treasuries to political parties for party-building 
activities and issue advocacy.93 Those who see the First Amendment 
as protecting an idealized democratic process free of "the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth"94 are more likely 
to accept the limitations that BCRA imposes. In contrast, the textual-
ism and antifunctionalism evidenced by the Republican Party majority 
are more likely to see such purported justifications as resorting "to the 
notion that the First Amendment provides less protection during elec-
tion campaigns than at other times."95 BCRA's content-based restric-
tions thus may have difficulty surviving a constitutional challenge 
should the Court approach the law with the textualist, antifunctional-
ist analysis it employed in Republican Party. 
92 See Pub L. No. I07-155, § 101, II6 Stat. 81, 82 (2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i). 
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note 90, at 5 I -54. 
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94 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 66o (1990) (Marshall,].). 
95 Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2539 (Scalia,].). 
1 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 158-59 (1939) (invalidating certain laws prohibit-
ing or regulating the distribution of leaflets, as applied to proselytizing by Jehovah's Witnesses); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 300 (1940) (overturning the convictions of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses for violating a statute prohibiting the solicitation of money for alleged religious causes 
without state approval and for inciting a breach of the peace); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 
105, 107 (1943) (invalidating a license tax that applied to door-to-door religious pamphleteers); 
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943) (invalidating an ordinance prohibiting the distributors 
of leaflets from, among other things, ringing doorbells and knocking on doors of private resi-
dences); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (overturning the conviction of a Jehovah's 
Witness for distributing religious literature without permission in a company-owned town). 
2 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164; see also Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-47 (recognizing the distribution 
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